UGRID
Ukrainian National Grid
Certification Authority
Certificate Policy
and
Certification Practice Statement
Version 1.4 draft
Document OID: 1.2.840.113612.5.4.2.6.1.1.1.4
December 2007
The UGRID project
goals are
·
creation of a national
·
integrate UGRID with European Grid-infrastructure,
take an active part in the formation of new European Grid concept (EGI);
·
organize dissemination events in the society to
enhance knowledge about Grid technology and skills of Grid using which will
help national scientists and researchers to design and develop applications on
Grid-infrastructure;
·
provide efficient collaborative using of the
computers, unique experimental equipments and devices, scientific data of
researchers.
·
take a part in the FP7 with the help and support of
the EGI.
The Ukraine Grid Certification Authority is created to provide the needs
of Ukrainian research and education community for Public Key Infrastructure
service, as well as to allow integration UGRID infrastructure with European and
World Grids.
The UGRID CA is hosted and operated at the
The current Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement
(CP/CPS or “the Policy”) document defines the rules and operational procedures
followed by the UGRID CA, including the minimum requirements and
obligations for the issuance and management of certificates. It is structured
in accordance with the layout set in IETF RFC 3647.
1.2 Document name and identification
Document title |
The UGRID CA
Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement |
Document version |
Version 1.4 |
Document date |
13.12.2007. |
ASN.1 Object Identifier (OID) |
1.2.840.113612.5.4.2.6.1.1.1.4 |
1.3.1 Certification Authorities
The UGRID CA is defined as a medium assurance CA. The UGRID CA does not issue certificates to subordinate Certification Authorities. The UGRID CA issue certificates under the approved versions of this CP/CPS document. Distribution of the validation process shall be implemented using a network of trusted Registration Authorities (RAs).
1.3.2 Registration Authorities
The procedures of verification of the Subscriber’s identity and of
approving their certificate requests are performed by trusted individuals –
Registration Authorities. Such trusted intermediaries are formally assigned by
the UGRID CA, their identities and contact details are published in the
online repository (as described in section 2.2), and the information is
updated regularly. The RAs are required to declare their understanding of and
adherence to this CP/CPS, and to perform their functions in accordance with it.
RAs do not issue certificates.
Certificates may be
issued both to individuals and to computer entities. Eligible for certification
by the UGRID CA are individuals or computer entities working for
organizations formally based in and/or having offices inside the
All entities
(including users of the Grid computing infrastructures) that employ the public
keys in certificates, issued by the UGRID CA, for signature verification
and/or encryption will be considered as relying parties.
No stipulation.
1.4.1 Appropriate certificate usage
The certificates
issued by the UGRID CA may be used for any application that is suitable
for X.509 certificates (e.g. e-mail signing and encryption (S/MIME),
authentication and encryption of communications (SSL/TLS), network layer
encryption (IPsec), object-signing, etc.), explicitly excluding the
applications described in the following section.
1.4.2 Inappropriate certificate usage
Usage of the
certificates issued by the UGRID CA for financial transactions or in
violation of the
1.5.1 Organization administering the document
The UGRID CA CP/CPS is authored and administered by the
The address of the UGRID
CA for operational issues is:
CERTIFICATION
AUTHORITY
High-Performance
Computing Center
37, Prospect
Peremohy,
03056, Kyiv-56,
Phone:
+380444068013
Fax: +380444068013
The contact person
for questions about this CP/CPS document or any other the UGRID CA related
issues is:
Velichkevych V.
Sergiy
High-Performance
Computing Center
37, Prospect
Peremohy,
03056, Kyiv-56,
Phone:
+380444068013
Fax: +380444068013
Email:
serg@ugrid.org
1.5.3 Person
determining CPS suitability for the policy
The person
determining the CPS suitability for the policy is:
Velichkevych V.
Sergiy
High-Performance
Computing Center
37, Prospect
Peremohy,
03056, Kyiv-56,
Phone:
+380444068013
Fax: +380444068013
Email:
serg@ugrid.org
1.5.4 CPS approval
procedures
The approved
document shall be submitted to EUGridPMA for acceptance and accreditation.
1.6 Definitions and
acronyms
The following
definitions and acronyms are used in this document:
|
|
|
Authentication |
Authentication is the
process of identifying a user. Usernames and passwords are the most common
method of authentication |
|
Certificate |
Information issued by a
trusted third party. Used to identify an individual or a system. Contains at
least a subject, a unique serial number, an issuer and a validity period. |
|
Certificate Authority |
An internal entity or
trusted third party that issues, signs, revokes, and manages digital
certificates. |
|
Certificate Extension |
Optional fields in a
certificate. |
|
Certificate Policy |
Rules that a request must comply
with for the RA to approve the request or a CA to issue the certificate. |
|
Certificate Revocation List |
List of certificates that
have been declared invalid. This list is issued by the CA at a regular
interval and is used by applications to verify if a certificate is to be
trusted. |
|
Certification Practice
Statement |
Document that regulates
rights and responsibilities of all the parties involved (RA, CA, directory
service, end entity, relying party) |
|
Certification Service
Provider |
Individual or corporation
that issues certificates to individual or corporate third parties. |
|
CP |
Þ Certificate
Policy |
|
CPS |
Þ Certification
Practice Statement |
|
Credentials |
Evidence or testimonials
concerning the user's right to access certain systems (e.g. username,
password, etc) |
|
CRL |
Þ Certificate
Revocation List |
|
CSP |
Þ Certification
Service Provider |
|
Distinguished Name |
Þ Subject |
|
DN |
Þ Distinguished
Name |
|
Extension |
Optional fields in a X509
Certificate. |
|
Identity Provider (IdP) |
(Shibboleth
term.) Authority responsible for generating and asserting authentication,
authorization, and identity information about their users in a security
domain. This means the Identity Provider ·
registers its users and stores
information about them ·
is able to authenticate their users |
|
OCSP |
Online Certificate Status
Protocol: method to verify in real-time if a certificate is valid. |
|
Participants |
Entities like CAs, RAs, and
repositories. These can be different legal entities. |
|
PKI |
Þ Public Key
Infrastructure |
|
Private Key |
One of two keys used in
public key cryptography. The private key is known only to the owner and is
used to sign and decrypt messages. The private key of a public-private key
cryptography system. This key is used to “sign” outgoing messages, and is
used to decrypt incoming messages. |
|
Public Key |
One of two keys used in
public key cryptography. The public key can be known to anyone and is used to
verify signatures and encrypt messages. |
|
Public Key Infrastructure |
Processes and technologies
used to issue and manage digital identities for the use of third parties to
authenticate individuals. Abbrev. PKI. |
|
RDN |
Þ Relative
Distinguished Name |
|
Relative Distinguished Name |
Þ Subject |
|
Revocation |
Invalidation of a
certificate. Every CA regularly issues a list of revoked certificates called
CRL. This list should be verified by all applications that use certificates
from that CA before trusting a certificate. |
|
Rollover |
To rollover a certificate
means that a new certificate is issued while the old is still valid and
usable. This is used to issue a new CA certificate while keeping the old
valid and all the certificates that were issued with it. |
|
Service Provider (SP) |
A collection of
Resources. However, since most Service Providers contain only one Resource,
the term Service Provider is often used as synonym for Resource, although
more in a technical sense. |
|
Signature |
Cryptographic element that
is used to identify the originator of the document and to verify the
integrity of the document. |
|
SSO |
Single Sign On. The user
only needs to login once to access various services. |
|
Subject |
Field
in the Certificate that identifies the owner of the certificate. Also
referred to as distinguished name (DN). The DN is composed of several fields,
called relative distinguished names (RDN), which have the structure variable_abbreviation=value. |
|
The key words
"MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED",
"SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD
NOT", "RECOMMENDED", „MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in
this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119.
All the online and off-line repositories of the UGRID CA are
operated by the
The address of the UGRID
CA for issues regarding the repositories is:
CERTIFICATION
AUTHORITY
High-Performance
Computing Center
37, Prospect
Peremohy,
03056, Kyiv-56,
Phone: +380444068013
Fax: +380444068013
Email: repositories@ugrid.org
2.2 Publication of certification information
The UGRID CA is obligated to maintain a secure online repository,
which shall be available to all Relying Parties through a web interface at the
following URL:
http://www.ca.ugrid.org/
It contains:
·
the UGRID CA certificate for its signing key;
·
all valid issued certificates referencing this Policy;
·
the latest CRL;
·
a copy of the current and of all previous versions of
this CP/CPS document, under which certificates have been issued;
·
the current list of the formally assigned staff
members of the UGRID CA;
·
the current list of the operational Registration
Authorities;
·
all available X.509 certificates of the staff members
and RAs;
·
all available PGP keys of the staff members, RAs, and
the UGRID CA itself;
·
official contact e-mail address and physical contact
address of CA and RAs;
·
other information related to certificates that refer
to this Policy.
The repository is maintained on a best effort basis. Excluding
maintenance shutdowns and unforeseen failures, the site should be available 24
hours a day, 7 days a week.
2.3 Time or frequency of publication
·
Certificates will be published as soon as
they are issued.
·
CRL will be
published immediately after it is updated following a revocation. It will be updated at least 7 days
before the next update
date of the CRL. The CRL life time is 30 days.
·
This CP/CPS will be published whenever it
is updated.
All other public
information shall be published promptly after its update or after it
becomes available
to the CA.
2.4 Access control on repositories
The UGRID CA does not impose any access control restrictions on the
information available at its online repository. However, the UGRID CA may
to impose more restricted access control in future at its discretion.
Each subscriber
must have a clear and unique Distinguished Name (DN) in the certificate subject
field, structured according to the X.500 standards. The UGRID CA will ensure that a DN is not reused. If a
person requests a certificate with the same DN as an existing
certificate (regardless of the status of this certificate) and the
request is not a renewal or rekey, the RA Operator will consult the
original personal
information to ensure that the Subscriber
is the same as the person who was identified in the
original certificate. If this identity cannot be
established, the DN will never be reused.
The DN under this
CP/CPS shall start with “DC=org, DC=ugrid”. Thereafter, the subscriber’s class,
defined as either “people”, “hosts”, or “services”, shall
be attached in the form “O=class”.
The DN may further
contain the affiliation of the subscriber to his/her organization (this
organization must be one of the organizational end-entities allowed for in
section 1.3.3) as organizationName attribute (O=). Inclusion of the
affiliation is not entirely optional, but decided by the UGRID CA. If an
organization consists of multiple administrative divisions, the division name
may be included in the subject name as an organizationalUnitName attribute
(OU=). Changes in the division name that do not change the organizational
layout itself do not constitute reason to invalidate the current unit name.
In case of a user
certificate, the commonName attribute (CN=) must include the full name of
the subscriber in Latin letters as per his/her ID document. There must be at
least two distinct (separated by spaces) parts in the name.
When the subscriber
wishes to apply for multiple certificates with different DNs (e.g. for some of
the Grid middleware), a serial number (left-padded with zeros to three digits,
e.g. 003) or another appropriate set of distinguishing characters shall be
added to the CN of each of the certificates.
If the subscriber
wishes to include an e-mail address in the certificate, the address must not be
part of the CN. Instead, it shall be included as rfc822Name attribute in the
subjectAlternativeName extension.
In case of a host
certificate, the commonName attribute (CN=) must include the
fully-qualified domain name (FQDN) of the host. Additional FQDNs may be
asserted in the subjectAlternativeName extension in multiple dNSName
attributes. The FQDN must meet the PrintableString definition of RFC 2252,
excluding comma, double quote, and single quote characters.
Otherwise (e.g. if
the FQDN is an internationalized one), or if a FQDN is not assigned, the entity
is not eligible for certification.
In case of a service
certificate, the commonName attribute (CN=) must include the service name
and the server’s FQDN, separated by a forward slash. The service name and the
FQDN must meet the PrintableString definition of RFC 2252, excluding comma,
double quote, and single quote characters. Otherwise, or if an FQDN is not
assigned, the entity is not eligible for certification.
3.1.2 Need for names to be meaningful
The subscriber must
be represented by an easily understandable subject name associated with the
authenticated name of the subscriber.
3.1.3 Anonymity or pseudonymity of subscribers
The UGRID CA shall not issue or sign pseudonymous or anonymous
certificates.
3.1.4 Rules for interpreting various name forms
See section 3.1.1.
Global uniqueness of each subject name shall be
guaranted by the UGRID CA. When this can not be achieved by other means,
an appropriate set of distinguishing characters (e.g. a random number) shall be
added to the commonName attribute.
3.1.6 Recognition, authentication, and role of
trademarks
No stipulation.
3.2 Initial identity validation
3.2.1 Method to prove possession of key
The
The UGRID CA shall not generate key pairs for the subscribers, nor
shall it accept or retain private keys generated by the subscribers themselves.
3.2.2 Authentication of organization identity
Organizations shall
be authenticated by the UGRID
CA (or an RA on its behalf) on the basis of copies of signed and
stamped official documents required by the Ukrainian law. In order to ensure
that the organization conforms to the requirements of section 1.3.3.,
additional documents may be required.
3.2.3 Authentication of individual identity
Certificates,
issued by the CA, bind a subject name to an identified entity that is in
possession of the private key pertaining to that certificate. This binding
shall be authenticated by the CA or its assigned RAs.
The initial
authentication of natural person shall be based on government-issued
identification documents and physical appearance of the applicant to the CA or
RA.
If the entity is a
machine or software component, the requester (a natural person) must provide
proofs that the binding will be to the service or system defined in the subject
and that the requester is adequately authorized.
When necessary,
e-mail addresses shall be verified via non-cryptographic challenge-response
technique.
The UGRID CA or RA will store photocopies of ID
documents in case of user certificates and digitally signed e-mails in case of
host or service certificates.
3.2.4 Non-verified subscriber information
During the initial
identity validation the requester's e-mail is not verified, unless it will be
present in the requested certificate.
The subscriber must present
suitable documents proving any claimed affiliation with an organization.
3.2.6 Criteria of interoperation
No stipulation.
3.3 Identification and authentication for
re-key requests
3.3.1 Identification and authentication for
routine re-key
To re-key before
expiration one can send a re-key e-mail request, signed with the current user
certificate. After expiration re-key procedure equals to the one for a new
certificate. The subscriber must go through the procedure equal to the
application for a new certificate at least once every 3 years.
3.3.2 Identification and authentication for
re-key after revocation
A revoked key shall
not be re-certified. Re-key after revocation follows the same authentication
procedure as for a new certificate.
3.4 Identification and authentication for
revocation request
The UGRID CA needs authentication of a revocation request, in case
it cannot independently verify that the case is one of the listed in section 4.9.1.
Certificate
revocation requests should be submitted via e-mail. If made for a user
certificate, the e-mail must be signed by the private key, corresponding to a
non-expired, non-revoked valid certificate, issued by
When using
digitally signed e-mail is not an option, and in all cases not explicitly
defined here, the authentication must be performed by the procedure for the
initial identity validation (section 3.2).
4.1.1 Who can submit a certificate application
·
The subject must be an acceptable subscriber as
defined in section 1.3.3;
·
The applicant must have read and agreed to adhere to
the policies and procedures described in this document;
·
The applicant must generate a key pair using a
trustworthy method, where the key length must be at least 1024 bits and the
validity of the requested certificate must be at most one year plus one month.
The UGRID CA will never generate a key pair for an applicant, nor will
it accept private key escrow responsibilities. Requests that contain a private key
shall be rejected immediately.
·
The applicant must protect the private key with a
secure pass phrase: at least 15 characters long and including small and capital
letters, numerals, and punctuation signs. In case of a host or service
certificate in automated environments where encryption of the private key is
either impossible or does not constitute a benefit for the key security, the
private key may be kept in unencrypted form. In any case, the physical and
electronic access to the private key must be kept appropriately restricted at
all times.
4.1.2 Enrollment process and responsibilities
The RA
authenticates a subscriber for the first time and then once in 3 years,
following the procedure described in section 3.2.3.
After successful
authentication, the subscriber must sign an explicit statement that he/she: a)
has read this Policy and accepts to adhere to it; b) shall accept
his/her certificate(s) signed by the UGRID CA; c) shall protect
the relevant private key(s) in accordance with the rules of this Policy, and d)
assumes the responsibility to notify the UGRID CA immediately in case of
possible private key compromise or when a certificate is no longer required or
when the information in a certificate becomes invalid.
Next, the RA shall
assign a 25-character random code (capital letters and numerals, in groups of
five, separated by dashes) to the request and supply it together with all the
collected information (requester's name, e-mail address, affiliation, FQDN,
service name, etc., as applicable) to the UGRID CA via a signed and
encrypted e-mail, accompanied with a phone call to the relevant the UGRID CA
staff member.
If the subscriber
has opted to provide his certificate request directly to the RA in person at
the time of authentication, the request shall also be included in the
information supplied to the UGRID CA. Otherwise, the random code shall be provided to the subscriber, who has 5 working
days from this point of time to submit his/her certificate request.
Unless the
subscriber has provided his request for a new certificate directly to the RA in
person, the submission of a request must be done either via encrypted e-mail to
the RA before whom the subscriber has been authenticated or via an SSL
protected web interface at the the UGRID CA online repository (section 2.2).
When using e-mail,
besides the request itself, it must also include the random code given at
authentication. The e-mail must be encrypted to the relevant RA X.509
certificate or PGP key from the UGRID CA online repository.
The random code
shall also be required when using the web interface.
If the subscriber
wants to re-key his/her certificate, then he/she must follow the procedures
described in section 4.7.
4.2 Certificate application processing
4.2.1 Performing identification and authentication
functions
In the case of a
new certificate, the request shall be authenticated and the information
included within validated by the RA directly, as described in sections 3.2.2
and 3.2.3. In the case of re-key of a valid, non-revoked, non-expired
certificate, the authentication shall be performed by checking that the
requester has a valid
4.2.2 Approval or rejection of certificate
applications
To be approved the
application request must conform to the following provisions:
·
the certificate application must first be successfully
authenticated;
·
the subscriber must provide the correct random code
during initial authentication or within
5 working days after a successful authentication performed by the RA;
·
the subject must be an acceptable entity as defined by
this Policy;
·
the request must obey the UGRID CA distinguished
name scheme;
·
the distinguished name must be unambiguous and unique;
·
the certificate key must have at least 1024 bits
length.
If the certificate
request does not meet one or more of the above criteria, it shall be rejected
and a signed notification e-mail shall be sent to the applicant.
4.2.3 Time to process certificate applications
A certificate
application shall take no more than 5 working days to be processed.
4.3.1 CA actions during certificate issuance
Right after the
subscriber's certificate has been issued, a signed and encrypted email shall be
sent to the relevant RA, informing him/her about the action.
4.3.2 Notification to subscriber by the CA of
issuance of certificate
Right after the
subscriber's certificate has been issued, a signed e-mail shall be sent to
him/her with information on how to download his/her certificate from the UGRID
CA online repository.
4.4.1 Conduct constituting certificate
acceptance
Since the
subscriber has already declared that he/she will accept his/her certificate
issued by the UGRID CA as described in section 4.1.2, each certificate
is considered accepted from the moment of its issuance.
4.4.2 Publication of the certificate by the CA
All certificates
issued by the UGRID CA shall be published in the online repository as
described in section 2.
4.4.3 Notification of certificate issuance by
the CA to other entities
Right after the
subscriber's certificate has been issued, a signed and encrypted email shall be
sent to the relevant RA, informing him/her about the action.
4.5 Key pair and certificate usage
4.5.1 Subscriber private key and certificate
usage
The issued by the UGRID CA
certificates may be used for any application that is suitable for X.509
certificates (e.g. e-mail signing and encryption (S/MIME), authentication and
encryption of communications (SSL/TLS), network layer encryption (IPsec),
object-signing, etc.), explicitly excluding those described in section 1.4.2.
Subscriber’s keys must not be shared. The physical and electronic access to the
private key must be kept appropriately restricted at all times. The subscriber
must notify the UGRID CA immediately in case of possible private key
compromise or when a certificate is no longer required or when the information
in a certificate becomes invalid.
4.5.2 Relying party public key and certificate
usage
The relying parties
may use the certificates of the subscribers for the reciprocal activities of
the stated ones in the previous section (e.g. signature verification,
encryption). The relying parties should download the CRL at least once a day
and implement its restrictions while validating certificates.
4.6.1 Circumstance for certificate renewal
The UGRID CA will not renew a subscriber’s certificate. Subscribers
must follow the re-key procedure as defined in section 4.7.
Same as in section 4.6.1.
4.6.3 Processing certificate renewal requests
Same as in section 4.6.1.
4.6.4 Notification of new certificate issuance
to subscriber
Same as in section 4.6.1.
4.6.5 Conduct constituting acceptance of a
renewal certificate
Same as in section 4.6.1.
4.6.6 Publication of the renewal certificate by
the CA
Same as in section 4.6.1.
4.6.7 Notification of certificate issuance by
the CA to other entities
Same as in section 4.6.1.
4.7.1 Circumstance for certificate re-key
Subscribers should
regenerate their key pair in such cases:
4.7.2 Who
may request certification of a new public key
Same as in section 4.1.1.
4.7.3 Processing certificate re-keying requests
The subscriber
shall send a re-key request signed with the current user certificate before
re-key expiration. The request must include the same explicit statement as the
one signed by the subscriber after successful authentication, as described in 4.1.2,
where under “this Policy” the latest CP/CPS document, available from the UGRID
CA online repository at this time, shall be assumed.
The UGRID CA reserves the right to reject the request or postpone
its processing if the overlap between the new certificate and the old one would
be unjustified.
Re-key after
expiration or due to revocation or compromise of certificate must follow the
same authentication procedure as the one described for a new certificate.
The subscriber must
go through the procedure equal to the application for a new certificate at
least once every 3 years.
4.7.4 Notification of new certificate issuance
to subscriber
Same as in section 4.3.2.
4.7.5 Conduct constituting acceptance of a
re-keyed certificate
Since the
subscriber has already declared that he/she will accept his/her certificate
issued by the UGRID CA as described in section 4.7.3, each
re-keyed certificate is considered accepted from the moment of its issuance.
4.7.6 Publication of the re-keyed certificate
by the CA
Same as in section 4.4.2.
4.7.7 Notification of certificate issuance by
the CA to other entities
Same as in section 4.4.3.
4.8.1 Circumstance for certificate modification
A certificate
should not be modified in any way.
4.8.2 Who may request certificate modification
No stipulation.
4.8.3 Processing certificate modification
requests
No stipulation.
4.8.4 Notification of new certificate issuance
to subscriber
No stipulation.
4.8.5 Conduct constituting acceptance of
modified certificate
No stipulation.
4.8.6 Publication of the modified certificate
by the CA
No stipulation.
4.8.7 Notification of certificate issuance by
the CA to other entities
No stipulation.
4.9 Certificate revocation and suspension
4.9.1 Circumstances for revocation
A certificate shall
be revoked in any of the following cases:
·
the subject of the certificate has ceased being
eligible for certification as described in this Policy;
·
the subject does not require the certificate any more;
·
the private key has been lost or compromised;
·
the information in the certificate is proven to be
wrong or inaccurate;
·
the host or service, to which the certificate had been
issued, has been retired;
·
the subscriber has failed to comply with the rules of
this Policy.
4.9.2 Who can request revocation
The revocation of a
certificate may be requested by:
·
CA and RAs;
·
the certificate subscriber him/herself;
·
any other entity presenting proof of circumstance
listed in section 4.9.1.
4.9.3 Procedure for revocation request
The authentication
of the entity requesting the certificate revocation shall be accomplished
through signing the revocation request with a valid the UGRID CA certificate.
If it is not available, the authentication must be performed within the
procedure described in section 3.2.3.
4.9.4 Revocation request grace period
No stipulation.
4.9.5 Time within which CA must process the
revocation request
The UGRID CA shall process all revocation requests in not more than
one working day.
4.9.6 Revocation checking requirement for
relying parties
Relying parties
should download the CRL from the online repository (section 2.2) at
least once per day and implement its restrictions while validating
certificates.
CRL
lifetime is 30 days. The CRL shall be issued immediately after each revocation, or at least
7 days before the expiration of the previous CRL.
4.9.8 Maximum latency for CRLs
The CRL shall be
issued within one hour after each revocation.
4.9.9 On-line revocation/status checking
availability
No stipulation.
4.9.10 On-line revocation checking requirements
No stipulation.
4.9.11 Other forms of revocation advertisements
available
No stipulation.
4.9.12 Special requirements re key compromise
No stipulation.
4.9.13 Circumstances for suspension
The UGRID CA does not suspend certificates.
4.9.14 Who can request suspension
See
section 4.9.13.
4.9.15 Procedure for suspension request
See section 4.9.13.
4.9.16 Limits on suspension period
See section 4.9.13.
4.10 Certificate status services
4.10.1 Operational characteristics
The UGRID CA online repository contains a CRL. Within one hour
following revocation, the CRL and/or certificate database in the repository, as
applicable, shall be updated.
The online
repository is maintained on a best effort basis with an intended availability
of 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.
No stipulation.
No stipulation.
4.12.1 Key escrow and recovery policy and
practices
The UGRID CA will not accept private key escrow responsibilities.
Requests that contain a private key shall be rejected immediately.
4.12.2 Session key encapsulation and recovery
policy and practices
No stipulation.
5.1.1 Site location and construction
The UGRID CA functions functions in a monitored area, located in
the
Physical access to
The UGRID CA sites is restricted to the authorized personnel only, and
the areas are under constant monitoring.
5.1.3 Power and air conditioning
The signing machine
and the repository web server are both powered by a protected power supply. The
environment temperature in the rooms containing the CA equipment is maintained
at appropriate level by an air conditioning system and monitored by an
independent mechanism.
Due to the location
of the UGRID CA facilities, floods are not expected.
5.1.5 Fire prevention and protection
All facilities of
the
Backup copies of
the UGRID CA-related information are kept in encrypted form on several
removable storage media of different types (optical, magnetic, flash) in secure
locations.
Waste, containing
potential confidential information, is physically destroyed before being dumped.
No off-site backups
are currently performed.
All employees,
contractors, and consultants of the UGRID CA (collectively “personnel”)
that have access to or control over cryptographic operations that may
materially affect the CA’s issuance, use, suspension, or revocation of
certificates, including access to restricted operations of the CA’s repository,
shall, for purposes of this Policy, be considered as serving in a trusted role.
Such personnel include, but are not limited to, system administration
personnel, operators, engineering personnel, and executives who are designated
to oversee the CA’s operations.
5.2.2 Number of persons required per task
No stipulation..
5.2.3 Identification and authentication for
each role
No stipulation.
5.2.4 Roles requiring separation of duties
No stipulation.
5.3.1 Qualifications, experience, and clearance
requirements
The UGRID CA personnel must be familiar with the PKI infrastructure
and operation, and possess the relevant technical and professional competence.
There are no background checks or clearance procedures for trusted or other
roles.
5.3.2 Background check procedures
No stipulation.
Internal training
is given to the UGRID CA personnel.
5.3.4 Retraining frequency and requirements
The UGRID CA shall perform internal operational audit of the CA/RA
staff at least once per year. If the results of the operational audit are not
satisfactory, retraining and/or other appropriate measures shall be considered.
5.3.5 Job rotation frequency and sequence
No stipulation.
5.3.6 Sanctions for unauthorized actions
No stipulation.
5.3.7 Independent contractor requirements
No stipulation.
5.3.8 Documentation supplied to personnel
Documentation
regarding all the operational procedures of the CA is supplied to the personnel
during the initial training period.
5.4.1 Types of events recorded
Signing machine and
repository server:
·
system boots, reboots, and shutdowns
·
user logins and privilege elevation (“su root”)
·
other important system information (e.g. kernel
messages, etc.)
In general:
·
requests for certificate (including log when request
comes and when it is approved or deleted)
·
requests for revocation
·
certificate issuing
·
CRL issuing
5.4.2 Frequency of processing log
Audit logs shall be
processed at least once per month.
5.4.3 Retention period for audit log
Audit logs shall be
retained for a minimum of 3 years after all certificates, relevant to these
logs, have expired.
Only authorized the
UGRID CA personnel is allowed to access and process audit logs. The
audit logs never leave the UGRID CA site of operation, except (for the
electronic logs) in encrypted form for backup purposes as stated in next
section.
The electronic
audit logs are protected by UNIX-style file system permissions.
The paper audit
logs are kept in a locked strongbox.
5.4.5 Audit log backup procedures
The electronic
audit logs are regularly (at least once per month) copied to an off-line
medium, which is stored in a location with the same access restrictions as for
the UGRID CA site of operation. Prior to copying, the audit logs shall
be encrypted with a suitable secure mechanism.
5.4.6 Audit collection system (internal vs.
external)
The audit log
accumulation system is internal to the UGRID CA.
5.4.7 Notification to event-causing subject
Entities that cause
an audit event are not explicitly notified of the audit action.
5.4.8 Vulnerability assessments
No stipulation.
5.5.1 Types of records archived
·
all certificate and revocation requests;
·
all issued certificates and CRLs;
·
all data (either on paper or in electronic form),
pertaining to the identity verification and certificate request information
validation;
·
all electronic and paper correspondence of the CA;
·
periodic digests of important system log files of the
issuing machine and the repository server;
·
all signed agreements with other parties.
5.5.2 Retention period for archive
The archive shall
be kept for a minimum of 3 years after all certificates, relevant to the
archived records, have expired.
Only authorized
5.5.4 Archive backup procedures
The electronic
record archives are regularly (at least once per month) copied to an off-line
medium, which is stored in a location with the same access restrictions as for
The UGRID CA site. Prior to copying, the record archives shall be
encrypted with a suitable secure mechanism.
5.5.5 Requirements for time-stamping of records
No stipulation.
5.5.6 Archive collection system (internal or
external)
The archive
collection system is internal to the UGRID CA.
5.5.7 Procedures to obtain and verify archive
information
No stipulation.
The UGRID CA will generate a new key pair when its current root
certificate is due to expire. From the moment the new CA root certificate is
published online only the new private key shall be used for certificate signing
purposes. The old but still valid root certificate shall be available to verify
old signatures, and the old private key shall be available to sign relevant
CRLs, until all the certificates signed using that key have expired or been
revoked. The overlap between the old and the new key shall be at least one year
plus one month.
5.7 Compromise and disaster recovery
5.7.1 Incident and compromise handling
procedures
If the UGRID CA private
key is compromised or suspected to be compromised, or if it is destroyed, the UGRID
CA shall immediately:
·
notify the subscribers and the RAs, as well as the
relevant relying parties of which/whom the UGRID CA is aware;
·
terminate the issuance and distribution of
certificates and CRLs until a new key pair is generated and the new CA root
certificate is published online;
·
notify all other relevant security contacts.
5.7.2 Computing resources, software, and/or
data are corrupted
The private keys of
the UGRID CA are only available in encrypted form on media stored in a
secure location. The machine used to activate the private key is not accessible
via any network. If the machine and/or the media are lost, this shall be
handled as a major compromise that implies generating a new key pair and
terminating all services associated with the lost key pair.
If the hardware or
software of the signing machine becomes corrupt, the status shall be diagnosed
and suitably repaired. If there is any doubt about the extent of the damage
involved, this shall imply rebuilding the machine from scratch, using original
supplied parts and software distributions.
If data become
corrupted, the cause shall be diagnosed and the data should be restored from
the latest back-up.
5.7.3 Entity private key compromise procedures
If an entity’s
private key is compromised or suspected to be compromised, or if it is
destroyed, the subscriber must immediately request revocation of the
certificate and inform all relevant relying parties.
5.7.4 Business continuity capabilities after a
disaster
No stipulation.
Upon permanent
termination of its activities as a CA, the UGRID CA shall:
·
notify the subscribers and the RAs, as well as the
relevant relying parties of which/whom the UGRID CA is aware;
·
terminate the issuance and distribution of
certificates and CRLs;
·
notify all relevant security contacts;
·
make the information of its termination as public as
possible.
6.1 Key pair generation and installation
Key pairs for the
CA, RAs, and subscribers must be generated in such a way that the private key
is not known by any other than the owner of the key pair.
Key pairs for the UGRID
CA are generated exclusively by authorized the UGRID CA staff
members on a dedicated, disconnected from all computer networks system, using a
recent, trustworthy version of the OpenSSL software package on a UNIX or
UNIX-like operating system.
The UGRID CA does not generate private keys on behalf of
subscribers. The subscribers’ private keys must never be sent to the UGRID
CA.
6.1.2 Private key delivery to subscriber
Not applicable (see
previous section).
6.1.3 Public key delivery to certificate issuer
The subscriber's
public key must be transferred to the UGRID CA in a secure way (either
via encrypted e-mail or via an SSL protected web interface).
6.1.4 CA public key delivery to relying parties
The UGRID CA root
certificate is available for download from the online repository (section 2.2).
The minimum key
length for a person, host, or service certificate is 1024 bits.
The minimum length
for the UGRID CA signing key is 2048 bits.
6.1.6 Public key parameters generation and
quality checking
No stipulation.
6.1.7 Key usage purposes (as per X.509 v3 key
usage field)
The UGRID CA root certificate shall have:
·
the basicConstraints extension marked critical and set
to “CA:true”;
·
the keyUsage extension marked critical, with the
keyCertSign and cRLSign bits set.
End entity
certificates issued by the UGRID CA under this Policy shall have:
·
the basicConstraints extension marked critical and set
to “cA:false”;
·
the keyUsage extension marked critical, with
digitalSignature and keyEncipherment bits set; other bits may be set as well if
required, except for nonRepudiation in host and service certificates, and keyCertSign
and cRLSign in all certificates;
·
the extendedKeyUsage including clientAuth/serverAuth
KeyPurposeId; other KeyPurposeIds (emailProtection, codeSigning, etc.) may be
included as well if required.
6.2 Private Key Protection and Cryptographic
Module Engineering Controls
6.2.1 Cryptographic module standards and
controls
No stipulation.
6.2.2 Private key (n out of m) multi-person
control
No stipulation.
No stipulation.
The UGRID CA private key is kept in encrypted form on media storage
as described in section 5.1.6. All media are located in secure places,
where access is restricted to authorized personnel only. Paper copy of the
private key’s pass phrase is also kept in a secure place.
The UGRID CA does not archive private keys except its own
private key corresponding to the UGRID CA certificate.
6.2.6 Private key transfer into or from a
cryptographic module
The UGRID CA does not use any kind of cryptographic module.
6.2.7 Private key storage on cryptographic
module
The UGRID CA does not use any kind of cryptographic module.
6.2.8 Method of activating private key
The private key of
the UGRID CA is activated by using a pass phrase. See section 6.4.1
6.2.9 Method of deactivating private key
No stipulation.
6.2.10 Method of destroying private key
After termination
of the CA, all media that contain the private key of the CA shall be securely
and permanently destroyed, according to the best practice at that time.
6.2.11 Cryptographic Module Rating
No stipulation.
6.3 Other aspects of key pair management
No stipulation.
6.3.2 Certificate operational periods and key
pair usage periods
All certificates
issued to subscribers by the UGRID CA shall have a maximum lifetime of
one year plus one month. The lifetime of the UGRID CA root certificate
is 5 years.
6.4.1 Activation data generation and
installation
The pass phrase
used to activate the UGRID CA private key is generated on the computer
used for the CA signing operations. It must be at least 15 characters long and
include small and capital letters, numerals, and punctuation signs. The pass
phrase shall be changed at irregular intervals of time, at least two times per
year.
The UGRID CA does not generate activation data for subscribers. It
is upon the subscriber to generate a secure pass phrase, at least 15 characters
long, and including small and capital letters, numerals, and punctuation signs,
in order to be used as activation data for his/her private key.
6.4.2 Activation data protection
The pass phrase for
the UGRID CA signing key is known only to the authorized the UGRID CA
operators. A copy of the pass phrase in written form, for backup purposes,
is kept in sealed envelope in a locked strongbox. Access to the strongbox is
restricted only to the authorized personnel. The envelope is checked for
tampering at least once a week. Old activation data are destroyed according to
the best practices at that time.
For end entity
certificates, the subscriber is responsible for protecting the activation data
for the private key.
6.4.3 Other aspects of activation data
No stipulation.
6.5 Computer security controls
6.5.1 Specific computer security technical
requirements
·
The operating systems of CA/RA computers are
maintained at a high level of security by applying all necessary patches and
updates in a timely manner.
·
Proactive monitoring is performed to detect
unauthorized software changes.
·
CA systems configuration is kept at the bare minimum.
·
The signing machine is kept disconnected from all
computer networks at any time. Any required patches and updates are downloaded
on the online repository server, and are strictly verified for correctness, if
applicable (e.g. MD5/SHA256 hashes, PGP signatures). Whenever available, source
code versions are preferred before the binary ones.
·
The signing machine is kept powered down between uses.
6.5.2 Computer security rating
No stipulation.
6.6 Life cycle technical controls
6.6.1 System development controls
No stipulation.
6.6.2 Security management controls
No stipulation.
6.6.3 Life cycle security controls
No stipulation.
·
The UGRID CA signing machine is kept
disconnected from all computer networks at any time.
·
CA/RA machines other than the signing machine are
protected by highly restrictive firewalls.
No stipulation.
All certificates
under this Policy shall be issued in the X.509 version 3 format and shall
include a reference to the OID of this Policy within the appropriate field.
7.1.2 CA Certificate extensions
·
basicConstraints
[critical] CA: true
·
keyUsage [critical]
keyCertSign, cRLSign
·
subjectKeyIdentifier hash
·
authorityKeyIdentifier keyIdentifier
·
basicConstraints
[critical] CA: false
·
keyUsage [critical]
digitalSignature, keyEncipherment
Other bits may be
set as well if required, except for nonRepudiation in host and service
certificates, and keyCertSign and cRLSign in all certificates.
·
extendedKeyUsage clientAuth
Other KeyPurposeIds
(emailProtection, codeSigning, etc.) may be included as well if required.
·
crlDistributionPoints at least one http URL
·
authorityKeyIdentifier keyIdentifier
·
subjectKeyIdentifier hash
·
certificatePolicies OID specified in section 1.2
·
subjectAlternativeName, issuerAlternativeName dNSName or
rfc822Name
subjectAlternativeName
shall be present for host and service certificates and shall contain at least
one FQDN in the dNSName attribute. rfc822Name attribute shall be used when an
end entity certificate needs to contain an RFC 822 email address.
Other certificate
extensions may be added when needed and appropriate.
7.1.4 Algorithm object identifiers
The UGRID CA uses SHA1 with RSA
encryption as its signature algorithm.
The distinguished
name of the CA is “DC=org, DC=ugrid, CN=
See section 3.1.1.
7.1.7 Certificate policy object identifier
The UGRID CA identifies this
Policy with the object identifier specified in section 1.2.
7.1.8 Usage of Policy Constraints extension
No stipulation.
7.1.8 Policy qualifiers syntax and semantics
No stipulation.
7.1.9 Processing semantics for the critical
Certificate Policies extension
No stipulation.
All CRLs shall be
issued in X.509 version 2 format.
7.2.2 CRL and CRL entry extensions
No stipulation.
No stipulation.
No stipulation.
8.1 Frequency or circumstances of assessment
The UGRID CA may be audited by other trusted CAs to verify its
compliance with the rules and procedures specified in this document. Any costs
associated with such an audit must be covered by the requesting party.
8.2 Identity/qualifications of assessor
No stipulation.
8.3 Assessor's relationship to assessed entity
No stipulation.
8.4 Topics covered by assessment
No stipulation.
8.5 Actions taken as a result of deficiency
No stipulation.
No stipulation.
9.1.1 Certificate issuance or renewal fees
No fees shall be
charged.
No fees shall be
charged.
9.1.3 Revocation or status information access
fees
No fees shall be
charged.
No fees shall be
charged.
Not applicable (see
sections 9.1.1 – 9.1.4).
The UGRID CA denies any financial responsibilities for damages or
impairments resulting from its operation.
Not applicable (see
section 9.2).
Not applicable (see
section 9.2).
9.2.3 Insurance or warranty coverage for
end-entities
Not applicable (see
section 9.2).
9.3 Confidentiality of business information
The UGRID CA does not collect any confidential business
information.
9.3.1 Scope of confidential information
Not applicable (see
section 9.3).
9.3.2 Information not within the scope of
confidential information
Not applicable (see
section 9.3).
9.3.3 Responsibility to protect confidential
information
Not applicable (see
section 9.3).
9.4 Privacy of personal information
The
UGRID CA does not collect any confidential or private information except for
the case when the UGRID CA or RA stores photocopies of ID documents to perform
identitiy validation for a user certificate request. The UGRID CA and RA
guarantee that this information is not used for any other purposes.
Not applicable (see
section 9.4).
9.4.2 Information treated as private
Not applicable (see
section 9.4).
9.4.3 Information not deemed private
The UGRID CA collects the following information which is not deemed
as private:
·
subscriber's e-mail address;
·
subscriber's name;
·
subscriber's organization;
·
subscriber's certificate.
9.4.4 Responsibility to protect private
information
Not applicable (see
section 9.4).
9.4.5 Notice and consent to use private
information
Not applicable (see
section 9.4).
9.4.6 Disclosure pursuant to judicial or
administrative process
Not applicable (see
section 9.4).
9.4.7 Other information disclosure
circumstances
Not applicable (see
section 9.4).
9.5 Intellectual property rights
IETF RFC 3647
AEGIS Certificate
Policy and Certificate Practice Statement
CERN Certification
Authority Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement
SWITCH Certificate
Policy and Certification Practice Statement
The DutchGrid Science Certification
Authority Certificate Policy and Certification Practices Statement
9.6 Representations and warranties
9.6.1 CA representations and warranties
No stipulation.
9.6.2 RA representations and warranties
No stipulation.
9.6.3 Subscriber representations and warranties
No stipulation.
9.6.4 Relying party representations and
warranties
No stipulation.
9.6.5 Representations and warranties of other
participants
No stipulation.
No stipulation.
·
The UGRID CA guarantees to
control the identity of the certification requests according to the procedures
described in this document
·
The UGRID CA guarantees to
control the identity of the revocation requests according to the procedures
described in this document
·
The UGRID CA is run on a best
effort basis and does not give any guarantees about the service security or
suitability
·
The UGRID CA shall not be held
liable for any problems arising from its operation or improper use of the issued
certificates
·
The UGRID CA denies any kind of
responsibilities for damages or impairments resulting from its operation
No stipulation.
No stipulation.
No stipulation.
9.10.3 Effect of termination and survival
No stipulation.
9.11 Individual notices and communications with
participants
No stipulation.
No stipulation.
9.12.1 Procedure for amendment
No stipulation.
9.12.2 Notification mechanism and period
No stipulation.
9.12.3 Circumstances under which OID must be
changed
No stipulation.